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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GENERAL LEASING COMPANY,

A Corporation,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

CASE NO. 17267

MANIVEST CORPORATION,
A Corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT·--oF THE FACTS
The facts and nature of the case have already been outlined
in Manivest's initial brief.

Manivest presnts this reply brief

in response to General Leasing Corporation's appeal on point
IV of its brief.

ARGUMENT
The trial court was correct in its determination that
there exists no unjust enrichment in this case because the
equipment installed by the Plaintiff was not requested nor was
permission given to install
Plaintiff·avers

t~e

equipment by the landlord.

that because of equipment which was placed

in a leased building at the request of a third party .four years
before Defendant :·retook possession,

which equipment was neither

asked for, nor was notice or permission given to Defendant
before its installation, that somehow the Defendant- o'W'es for it.
Plaintiff uses the often quoted, but in bhis instance misplaced,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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theory of unjust enrichment.

Regarding this unjust enrichment

argument, the trial court commented and ruled as follows:
"
The Court does not feel that this is a
proper case for unjust enrichment because of
the fact that the defendant did not give
permission. I don't think that a person, a
plaintiff, can go in and install equipment on
real property of another and when he says that
he will not sign a waiver for it, and then of
course it is an alleged case of unjust
enrichment and he has got to pay me for it.
I just don't think unjust enrichment is
applicable. Again, I may be incorrect on that,
but that is my analysis as far as the case is
concerned." (Record p. 253)
The principle of unjust enrichment is cited by the Utah
Courts and in Respondent's brief.
"
Unjust enrichment occurs whenever a person
has and retains money or benefits which in justice
and equity belong to another." L. & A. Dryway, Inc.
vs. Whitmore Construction Co., 608, P.2d 626, 30
(Utah 1980).
The equities in the instant case do not favor the Plaintiff and
are significantly dissimilar to the cases cited by Plaintiff/
Respondent.
Both cased cited by the Plaintiff /Respondent concerning the
applicability of unjust enrichment are basically two party
cases where one party has performed work for and at the behest
of the other party.

In the case at bar, the Defendant/Appellant

had nothing to do with the procuring of the equipment, nor did
Peck and Shaw or the Plaintiff /Respondent intend to benefit
Manivest Corporation.

The fact that Manivest may have been

incidentally benefited by the contract between Peck and Shaw
and General Leasing does not mean that Manivest is liable for
Peck
and Shaw's debts.
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n

The mere fact that a third person benefits from
between two other persons does not make
sue~ third person liable in quasi contract, unjust
enrichment, or restituiton. Moreover, where a third
person benefits from a contract entered into between
two other persons, in the absence of some misleading
act by the third person, the mere failure of
perfo:ma~ce by one of the contracting parties does
not give rise to a right of restitution against the
third person. ];n other words, a person who has·
conferred a benefit upon another, by the performance
of a contract with a third person, is not entitled
to restitution from the other merely because of the
failure of performance by the third person." (emphasis
ours) 66 Am Jur 2d Restitution and Implied Contracts,
§16 p. 960.
a

contr~ct

This law is consistent with common sense.

If defaulting

tenants were able to shift debts to the landlord of any physical
changes they may have made to the leasehold, landlords would be
seriously hindered.

1..Jhere the landlord makes no request, does

not grant pennission, nor is under notice of a tenants contract
to improve the leasehold, the landlord has no liability.

Section

110 of the Restatement of Restitution states:
"
A person who has conferred
another as the performance of a
third person is not entitled to
the other merely because .of the
formance by the third person."
Restitution, §110.

a benefit upon
contract with a
restitution from
failure of perRes tatement of

"
A promises to pay C, a jeweler, $15 per
month for ten.months in return for which C
promises irrnnediately to deliver a ring to A's
· fiancee, B, ~s a gift from A. There is no
agreement for C to retain a security interest
in the ring .. A makes the first payment of $15
and C sends the ring to B. Thereafter A fails
to make further payments. C is not entitled
to the return of the ring from B. Id.
In the above example, the girlfriend did not ask for the
ring and it was apparently given to her after negotiations with
the
jeweler
had Law
ended;
therefore,
she
did ofnot
for
it.
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This

example has been used in a case significantly analogous
to the one at bar.

In Meehan v. Cheltenham

Township 189 A.2d

593. (Penn 1963), the Court s.tated that when a town had approved
construction of some roads in a development, they did not owe
the contractor once the developer had gone bankrupt.
"
Where one party has been unjustly enriched
at the expense of another, he is required to make
restitution to the other. In order to recover, ·
there must be both (1) an enrichment, and (2) an
injustice resulting if recovery for the enrichment
is denied. See Bailis v. Reconstruction Finance
Corporation, 128 F.2d 856 (3d Cir., 1942); Restatement,
Restitution §l, comment a (1936). Appellant alleges
that appellee has been enriched by the acquisition
of a sewer and road system which has enlarged its
revenues through rnets from the use of the sewers
and increased real estate taxes on the improved lands.
Appellant concludes that 'the Township cannot in
justice refuse to compensate appellant for the fair
market value of the same.' This basis for recovery
misconceives both the role of appelle~ in the
construction of the improvements, and also the nature
of the unjust enrichment doctrine.
.
The construction of these improvements was not
performed at appellee's request. Appellee initially
entered the transaction solely because the First Class
Township Code requires that a developer obtain
township approval of the subdivision plan in order to
insure the safe and harmonious development of the
township. Later, the improvements were dedicated to the
township. Whether this act of dedication resulted
in a financial benefit to appellee is not clear since
the cost of maintaining and repairing the improvements
might offset any revenues obtained therefrom. In any
event, appellant cannot merely allege its own loss as
the measure of recover--i.e., the value of labor and
materials expended--but instead must demonstrate that
appellee has in fact been benefitted.
Moreover, even it the enrichment of appellee were
established, there would be no recovery in this case.
As noted above, the mere fact that one party benefits
from the act of another is not of itself sufficient to
justify restitution. There must also be an injustice
in permitting the benefit to be retained without
compensation.
The Restatement of Restitution sets forth various
·rules for the determination of whether the retention of
a particular enrichment is unjust. Section 110 deals
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with the situation where a third party benefits
from a contract entered into between two other
parties. It provides that, in the absence of some
misleading by the third party, the mere failure of
performance by one of the contracting parties does
not give rise· to a right of restitution against
the third party. The Restatement gives as an
example of this principle the situation where A
purchased a ring from C, a jeweler, for his financee
B and then defaults in the payments. The Restatement
states that C cannot recover the ring or its value
from B." Id at 595, 596.
In the ·.instant case, it is clear that General Leasing was
relying on the credit of Peck and Shaw and that Manivest did
not have anything to do with the installation.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Manivest believes it is clear·
that they are not liable to General Leasing on any unjust
enrichment theory.
Respectfully submitted on this~day of September, 1982.
MORGAN, SCALLEY & DAVIS
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